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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS' DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES

MARVIN E. KANNE

Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

Saint Thomas Aquinas holds that scientific knowledge is attained
when observable phenomena and their properties are accounted for in
terms of their relations to their causes. On establishing the divisions of
the sciences, Aquinas follows the threefold division of the speculative
sciences as proposed by Aristotle and handed on to the Middle Ages
by Boethius: natural philosophy, mathematics, and theology. Each
science is defined by its subject matter and by its method of procedure.
While Aquinas followed the teachings of Boethius on this point,
he makes significant additions and alterations. Thus in his analysis
Aquinas focuses his attention on the role played by the in tellect in the
determination of the formal perspective (ratio) from which the intellect
considers the various matters of science.
For Aquinas the intellect performs two operations: apprehension
and judgment. Here we shall be concerned with the operation of apprehension. This operation of the intellect is capable of two distinct kinds
of abstraction. First, there is the abstraction of form from sensible
matter. Second, there is the abstraction by which a universal is abstracted from its particular. The objects of the operation called abstraction of form are the objects of mathematics, and the objects of the
abstraction of the universal are the objects of science. Hence, the
intellect by means of its powers of abstraction plays a fundamental
role in establishing the division of the sciences.

by recording observable connections in nature and then calculating them in mathematical terms. When the observable
phenomena of nature and their properties are accounted for
in terms of their necessary relations to their causes, then we
have scientific knowledge. Insofar as we pursue a knowledge
of nature through its causes, our inquiry, according to
Aquinas, will ultimately be metaphysical; this is science at
its best. Science, then, does not aim at empirical knowledge
gained through experimentation, but rather at a knowledge
of the being and intelligible structures of things as seen in relation to their ultimate causes. In short, Aquinas holds the goal
of scientific inquiry to be metaphysical, not empirical.
Saint Thomas gives his views on the hierarchy and methodology of the sciences in several of his works, but his most
extensive and penetrating treatment of these subjects can be
found in Questions Five and Six of his unfinished "Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate." In this paper I will center my
attention on this work.

t t t
Wrule Saint Thomas draws no clear distinction between
science and philosophy, today many philosophers and scientists sharply distinguish between the two enterprises. In this
century an ideal of scientific knowledge is mathematical
physics with its use of precise calculations and a highly refined
method involving experimentation, formation of hypotheses,
and their verification. Aquinas' ideal, however, is different.
,~quinas holds there are four distinct types of cause: material,
IOfmal, final, and efficient. Scientific knowledge is a knowledge of things through these causes. Following Aristotle's
lead, Aquinas holds that scientific knowledge is attained when
", .. we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the
:ause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact
:ould not be other than it is" (Aquinas, 1955, 1941).
For Saint Thomas, scientific knowledge is not attained

Aquinas follows the threefold division of the speculative
sciences as proposed by Aristotle (I941) and as handed on to
the Middle Ages by Boethius: natural philosophy, mathematics, and theology. Each of these sciences is defined by its
subject matter and by its method of procedure. St. Thomas
followed the teacrung of Boethius on this point; however, as
we will see, he made significant additions and alterations.
To grasp the extent of these changes, let us briefly consider Boetruus' view of the sciences. According to Boethius,
the sciences were concerned with the forms, and the hierarchy
of the sciences corresponded exactly to the hierarchy of the
forms as found in the real world in their various degrees of
separation from matter. Consequently, natural prulosophy
studied the forms of bodies along with the bodies in wruch
these forms existed. Mathematics studied forms of bodies
apart from the matter of the bodies, e.g., lines, circles, etc.
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Theology studies forms that are entirely separate from matter,
e.g., God (Aquinas, 1963).
From this it is clear that Boethius had based his division
of the sciences on what he took to be the objective division
of reality. The branches of the sciences corresponded exactly
to the order of the forms, which were arranged in an ascending
hierarchy according to their degree of separation from matter.
For Boethius there was no need to investigate the acts of the
intellect by wlUch the different objects of the sciences were
comprehended. The intellect merely had to follow the division
of the forms that it found ready-made in the world.
In the case of mathematics there was an opportunity for
discussing the intellectual act whereby the object was attained,
for, while actually existing in ma Uer, mathematical forms
were to be considered separate from matter. It was this opportunity which Aquinas exploited to present his own additions and alterations, which were to show the essential
role played by the intellect in the determination of the subjects of the sciences. No longer were the sciences to be differentiated solely according to the distinction of the forms as
discovered ready-made in the world, but rather according to
the distinctions the mind itself made in the course of investigating reality. Each science was still to be differentiated by
its own subject. However, by the subject of a science Aquinas
did not simply mean the things considered by the science, or
its subject matter. Rather, the term "subject" designated the
formal perspective (ratio) from which the intellect considered
the various matters of science (Aquinas, 1963).
If we examine the operations of the intellect and the
distinctions it makes, our understanding of Aquinas' division
of the sciences will be enhanced. St. Thomas held that the
intellect basically performs two operations. First, there is the
understanding or apprehension of intelligible objects. By this
act we know more or less what things are, i.e., we grasp their
essences. Second, there is the operation of judgment, by which
we compose or divide what we have grasped in apprehension.
For example, understanding what green is and what grass is,
we unite the two in the affirmative judgment "Grass is green."
Or, understanding what an animal is and what a stone is, we
divide the two by saying "An animal is not a stone." In
making judgments, then, the intellect grasps not only the
essence of things but also their existence. That is, the second
operation of the intellect deals with how tlUngs exist. These
two operations correspond to what Aquinas held to be the two
principles of reality: the first operation is directed to the
essence of a being, and the second focuses on its existence

However, Aquinas did hold that by means of the fi
rSI
operation of the intellect one could correctly abstract sOIll
things that are not separate in reality. There are two distin (
kinds of abstractions. First, there is the abstraction by Whi~
quiddities of things are conceived. Here we have what AqUin ,
referred to as the abstraction of form from sensible matte~
this belongs to mathematics. Second, there is the abstractio t
by which a universal is abstracted from a particular. l'hil
belongs to science insofar as the sciences disregard accidental
features and treat only of necessary matters. (It should be
noted that for Aquinas these two kinds of abstraction COr.
respond to the two modes of union: union of form and mat.
ter and union of part and whole.) (Aquinas, 1963).
When that which constitutes the intelligibility of any
nature has a relational dependence on something else, We
cannot understand that nature apart from that on which it
depends. However, if one thing does not depend on another as
regards what constitutes the intelligibility of that nature, then
the intellect can abstract the one from the other. This remains
true regardless of whether the two things are united or separ.
ated in reality. Hence, a part can be understood without the
whole, as a letter can be understood without a syllable, but
not vice versa (Aquinas, 1941).
Let us now turn to the abstraction of the form (abstractio
jeJrrnac). St. Thomas points out in Question Five, Article Three
of IUs "Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate" that " ... a
form can be abstracted from matter if the essential nature of
the form does not depend on that particular kind of matter;
but the intellect cannot abstract form from the kind of matter
upon wlUch the form depends according to its essential na·
ture" (Aquinas, 1963). Since all accidents are related to sub·
stance as form to matter, and since every accident of its nature
depends on substance, no accidental form can be separated
from substance. However, accidents befall substance in a
definitely ordered fashion: first quantity, then qualitiesafter that passivities and motion. Hence, quantity can be con·
sidered before the sensible qualities. That is, for Aquinas
quantity did not depend upon sensible matter but only intel·
ligible matter. After the accidents have been abstracted, espe·
cially the sensible qualities, substance is intelligible to the
intellect alone, for substance is beyond the comprehension of
the sense powers. The objects of the operation called abstrac·
tion of form are the objects of mathematics. For Aquinas the
mathematician considers substance as quantified apart from
all qualitative characteristics. Such considerations are possible
because of the intellect's ability to abstract.

(I 963).
When the intellect judges correctly, it conforms to reality.
Consequently, in judging, the intellect cannot correctly abstract what is united in reality. The intellect can only correctly judge to be separate what is in reality separate. When the
judgments of the intellect fail to conform to reality, it is in
error (Aquinas, 1963).
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To comprehend this better it will be helpful to turn to
one of St. Thomas' later works, the Summa Thcologiae. While
reiterating his position on the operation of the intellect, in
the First Part, Question Eighty-five, Article One, "Reply to
Objection Two," St. Thomas gives a more detailed account
of his doctrine of matter. Aquinas considered matter as being
two-fold: common and signate (or individual matter). Common

ilIa t '
ter this flesh and these bones which make up my body.
Ina t

from any given individual, for he does not consider natures
as subject to here and now.

t;

Let me expand on this point. The natural philosopher
does not study something insofar as it is individuated by
matter of determinate dimensions (Aquinas, 1963). To grasp
what Aquinas has in mind here we must return to the Summa
Theologiae where he treats of the twofold division of matter:
common and signate (or individual). As mentioned before, an
example of common matter could be flesh and bones, and
individual matter could be this flesh and these bones. In
natural philosophy the intellect abstracts the species (form)
from the sensible matter, but not from common sensible matter. So, for example, the species (form) of man is abstracted
from this flesh and these bones. When speaking of particular
flesh and particular bones, one is concerned with a particular
individual as such, and not with the species of man. It is the
latter which is of concern to the natural philosopher. However, what is important to note is that according to AqUinas'
doctrine the species of man cannot be abstracted from
common sensible matter, i.e, flesh and bones. A natural species
such as that of man cannot be thought apart from indeterminate matter. Hence, the nature of man can be considered without considering particular flesh and particular bones, but it
cannot be considered absolutely apart from flesh and bones,
Such an abstraction is said to be the abstraction of a universal
from a particular, or abstractio totius, and it forms the basis
of science.

ter for example, could be flesh and bones, and individual

The intellect can abstract the species (form) of a natural thing
'om individual sensible matter. However, it cannot abstract
from the common sensible matter. For example, the intel:ect abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these
bones which belong to the notion of individual. However,
when considering the species of man it cannot abstract from
flesh and bones, i.e., common matter.
Mathematical species, as opposed to natural species, can
be abstracted from sensible matter: both individual and
common. However, mathematical species cannot be abstracted
from common intelligible matter. Sensible matter is corporeal
matter, and it is subjected to such sensible qualities as cold
or hot, hard or soft, etc. Since quantity is ontologically prior
to all the other qualities, the terminations of quantity, such
as number, dimension, and figure, can be considered apart
from the sensible qualities. When one studies mathematics,
one is abstracting from sensible matter. However, these mathematical terminations cannot be considered apart from substance as subject to quantity. To do so would be to abstract
from intelligible matter. Yet, they can be considered apart
from any given substance, for this is to abstract from individual intelligible matter (Aquinas, 1941).
Consequently, the abstraction in mathematics is not an
abstraction of an accidental form of quantity considered apart
from substance, for quantity necessarily inheres in substance.
That is, quantity does not exist as an independent form. In
Question Forty, Article Three of the First Part of the Summa
The%giae, Aquinas writes (1941):
.. , in the abstraction of form from the matter, both the
fornl and matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance,

if we abstract the form of a circle from brass there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both
cf a circle and of brass.
Let us now turn our attention to the abstraction of a
whole (aDstractio to tius) , which is performed by the natural
philosopher. The abstractio totius is the absolute consideration of some essence apart from the individuals whose nature
it is, The individuals are, so to speak, "parts" from which
nature a, a "whole" is abstracted (Aquinas, 1963). Such an
abstraciion is legitinlate if the nature of the whole does not
depend on the parts, such that the being of a particular whole
~ constituted by the composition of a particular part, as a
, syllable is composed of letters. In other words, such an abstractio to tius is legitimate insofa r as the parts are accidental
to the whole. The natural philosopher cannot abstract from
the esseniial "parts" of his subject matter. That is, he cannot
abstract from those "parts" that necessarily belong to the
Subject ma tier and are included in its definition. For example,
Since Ilnttcr and form are both necessary pariS of a material
being, he cannot absl ract from them, However, he can abstract

If these remarks are correct, we can draw a few conclusions regarding Aquinas' view of scientific activity. Given his
doctrine of substance, we can conclude that for Aquinas the
general object of the scientist's studies is the world we all
know. Aquinas is not subscribing to some variant of idealism.
The different scientific disciplines are generated by the fact
that man can consider the things of nature from different
perspectives. For example, a psychologist can study the mental processes and emotional and behavioral characteristics of
a man and leave out of consideration (abstract from) his vital
processes, such as heartbeat. However, in the concrete, no man
actually exists in such a split-level fashion. Each of us exists
as an unitary whole.
What enables the scientist to develop these different
perspectives? Aquinas holds that the division of the sciences
can be accounted for when we realize that the intellect can
actively leave out of consideration certain characteristics.
A more traditional empiricist view which considers ·the mind
as fundamentally passive would find it difficult to account
for this division. For example, when we observe a man, we
do not observe his emotional and behavioral characteristics
apart from his vital processes. We observe a unitary being.
Nevertheless, we recognize psychology and physiology as
distinct disciplines, and in terms of Aquinas this is because
the intellect plays an active role in scientific activity.
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